


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THE TOTAL FORCE
- TIME FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT -

BY

Colonel Robert C. Coon
United States Army

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**THE TOTAL FORCE:
TIME FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

**Colonel Robert C. Coon
United States Army**

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Project Advisor**



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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the force distribution and employment concepts of the United States Army Total Force. It lends a critical eye to the Minuteman paradigm and proposes changes in the way the United States Army augments the active forces with reserve components and reconstitutes in the event of mobilization. A framework is set that accounts for the changing environment of future military operations. Regional contingencies which require rapid response, vice the global war and graduated response, provides a new and essential role for the reserve component. Specifically, the Individual Ready Reserve and the National Guard assets are explored and alternatives are examined which speed the process of integrating reserve component forces into a theater, while providing highly trained and motivated forces to the CINC.

THE TOTAL FORCE:

TIME FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT

The concept of Total Force, born in the 1970s and tested in South West Asia in the 1990s, constitutes the essence of our National Defense Policy. And, while Desert Storm was a major success for our military it has, nonetheless, caused us to reevaluate the readiness, mix, and policies surrounding the Total Force.

"If force is going to do the bidding, you must commit the amount of force necessary to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion." (Dwight D. Eisenhower's remark to Pres. Johnson, 1966)

The purpose of this paper is to examine force distribution and employment within the active and reserve components and to determine if that distribution is adequate to meet the national military strategy. Is the Minuteman paradigm current, or is it time to construct new models for force generation and reconstitution?

THE HISTORICAL DIMENSION

Historically the United States has downsized the military after major wars. Political and economic factors required a refocusing on domestic issues. Dollars, manpower and training were reduced to minimal levels resulting in a military that was poorly equipped, hollow, and untrained. Furthermore, expansibility of such a military was both time consuming and very

expensive since both the Reserve Components and the industrial base was depleted even more so than the active force.

Well intentioned, intelligent, and motivated leaders such as Eisenhower, Bradley, and President Truman were at the forefront of military planning, yet we found ourselves in an unprepared state, unable to defend our nation's interests. Hindsight provides perfect 20/20 vision into the cyclical decay and rebuilding during times of peace and war. Likewise, it provides ample illustrations of the repercussions of a hollow, poorly trained and led army. These are the less glorious chapters in our history. They are characterized by failure and are remembered by names such as Kasserine Pass, Task Force Smith, and Desert One.

Our challenge today is to ensure, in the words of General Gordon Sullivan, "No more Task Forces Smiths." We must not repeat history's mistakes. We must continue our military stature into the next century, given the constraints of fewer dollars, fewer people and slower modernization. President Bush has provided clear guidance and intent in his State of the Union Message. He stated "...We must not go back to the days of the hollow army. We cannot repeat the mistakes made twice in this century, when armistice was followed by recklessness and defense was purged as if the world were permanently safe."¹

BACKGROUND

Current political and economic realities demand the downsiz-

ing of the Total Force. The Cold War is won and the Soviet threat is no longer prevalent.

United States national interests can be achieved by a

smaller military; a military that is professional, trained, equipped and ready. But, how do we compensate in force structure to accommodate this smaller force? What are the major roles of the Army in the future? Who is the enemy? These and a myriad of similar questions demonstrate the ambiguity of the current environment. Without answers to these basic questions, how do you build a structure (Active Component and Reserve Component) to meet the needs of our nation? We must start with assumptions.


Let us first assume that the National Security Strategy will remain unchanged. The concept of "containment" is gone. It is replaced by a four-point strategy: ensure strategic deterrence; exercise forward presence in key areas; respond effectively to crises; and retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces as they are needed.² These policy shifts can best be seen in the following chart which depicts the transition from the Cold War to a Post-Cold War era of "Peacetime Engagements."

Second, our military budget will continue to decline. The Army's share of that budget will likewise decline. Current programs provide the Army \$73 billion in 1991, \$71.3 billion in 1992, and \$67.9 billion in 1993 (constant dollars not factored).³

"...our task today is to shape our defense capabilities...to changing circumstances."


President Bush
2 Aug. 1990

NATIONAL SECURITY IN TRANSITION NEW POLICY AND STRATEGIES



By 1996 the Defense budget will consume 16.3% of the Federal outlays. This is the lowest share of the budget in over fifty years.⁴ It is prudent to assume that defense cuts will continue to be pursued by congressional members and that justification of current programs will become increasingly difficult in the out-years.

Third, the Army will continue to downsize in both active and reserve components. The Active Army will downsize from 739,594 on 31 December, 1990 to 535,000 in 1995. This



is a reduction of over one-quarter of the force. Likewise, the Reserve Components will be reduced from 776,000 in 1991 to 551,000 in 1995.⁵ Concurrent with the downsizing the Army will concentrate on the six imperatives of a quality force, overmatched equipment, correct doctrine, strong leadership, tough training, and a balanced force mix.⁶

THE PROBLEM

With the above assumptions the question becomes, how does the Army do more with less? Force mix and force employment are vital considerations when determining military projection during times of hostility. How quickly a suitable and well-trained force can be deployed is a major determinant of how successful our military will be in the future. To respond to the question..."is the current total army force organized with the proper distribution of forces...," the answer is yes...and no.

Current defense policy emphasizes the "total force concept." When addressing use of conventional forces for major regional contingencies and crisis response it states "...this approach [total force] would use reserve forces to augment and support forces deployed in prolonged and/or concurrent contingencies, and provide a sustaining base for other forward-deployed forces ... Global deterrence requires not only forces for strategic deterrence, forward presence, and contingency response but also the capability to reconstitute forces, if necessary, to respond to a major shift in Soviet strategy or the emergence of a major

new threat ... This readiness to rebuild is an important element in our ability to deter any such adverse shift in Soviet strategy."⁷

Recent experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm provides substantial evidence of the merit of "total force." Approximately 227,000 reserve component (RC) soldiers, sailors, and airmen were activated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Of these, about 140,000 were from the U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) or the National Guards (ARNG) of the various states.⁸ The Army federalized 398 ARNG units and 62,411 soldiers from forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico. Among those units activated and deployed to South West Asia were sixty ARNG Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel commands. Units were predominately combat support or combat service support units. No ARNG maneuver units were deployed.⁹ Additionally, on 18 January 1991 the President authorized the mobilization of 1,000,000 Ready Reserves for up to two years. The initial call-up was limited to 360,000 for one year. These soldiers and units filled critical voids in combat service and general support functions such as water purification, medical services, decontamination, and supply distribution. It should be noted that 94% of the Civil Affairs units were USAR. Likewise, 89% of the Enemy Prisoner of War Handling, 69% of the postal, and 65% of the Petroleum Handling were USAR.¹⁰ Finally, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) provided over 12,000 volunteers in the early stages of Desert Shield. President Bush's 18 January authorization opened the

door to call-up an additional 20,000 IRR. These soldiers, predominately from the combat arms, constitute the nation's largest source of trained individual manpower, short of breaking up active or reserve units. Of those IRR notified, over 92% reported to mobilization stations at the designated time and over 16,000 were activated.¹¹ Without these assets from the ARNG, USAR and IRR the great successes in South West Asia would not have been possible. To quote General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, . . . "The success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance, and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last ten years to strengthen the Total Force concept."¹²

Given our Desert Storm success in mobilizing and building a credible fighting force, why are we concerned with changing the total army model? Simply put, we cannot reasonably expect to duplicate our Desert Storm effort once we downsize our military in accordance with the current plan. If early force projection is necessary to win future wars, how does the United States accomplish that projection with a significantly smaller active and reserve structure?

Practically speaking, the military cannot buy a better force mixture within the budgetary constraints. The current mix allocates forces to the active and reserve components in each of the major fields of combat, combat support and combat service

support (see table I).¹³

This delicate balance is predicated on the maintenance of adequate active forces to

project immediate power in

concert with the national strategy, and the need to offer rapid expandability through reserve components if the need arises. The ability to sustain combat for anything greater than a short-term, low to mid-intensity, war is beyond the capability of the current active force structure. Further, the reduction of active component forces from 702,000 to 535,000 in 1995 exacerbates the problem in the out years.

The reserve force structure has been properly balanced to complement the active component. The USAR retains the primary responsibility of plusing-up the combat support and combat service support units. National Guard units retain the mission of providing combat units during protracted wars. If one accepts the premise that the budget and the force structure will be smaller, and that the AC/RC mix is about right in consideration of political and economic realities, how then can the United States project power in a timely manner to protect its national interests?

Table I TOTAL ARMY STRUCTURE

	COMBAT	CS	CSS
ACTIVE	46%	42%	30%
ARNG	46%	32%	26%
USAR	8%	26%	44%

A NEW DIRECTION

The answer rests not only in the force mixture but also in how those forces are employed. Perhaps it is time to relook old

paradigms and develop a new model for rapid force generation and reconstitution. According to a recent speaker at the Army War College, ". . . when considering risk/net assessment it is apparent that we must posture heavy forces early." We must look to the AC/RC mix and determine meth-

ods to project these forces into a theater in the minimum essential time. To maximize the expeditious flow of combat and combat support units into a developing theater, we must alter the employment of two subsections of Total Force ... the IRR and the ARNG.

The IRR constitutes a major resource which, until Desert Storm, had been largely untested. Within this group rests the largest pool of pretrained military available upon mobilization. Currently, the IRR numbers in excess of 415,000. Projected end strength in 1993 exceeds 490,000.¹⁴ Included in this pool are trained soldiers whose military occupation specialties (MOS) distribution matches the active component. While their skills decay over time, it was demonstrated during Desert Storm that they could rapidly "spin-up" to standards. The IRR is currently programmed to provide fillers to active and reserve units on an individual basis in the event of mobilization.

President Bush: "The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken down version of the same ones we possess...If we simply prorate our reductions - cut equally right across the board - we could easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must have to meet emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions, but restructuring."

At any given time approximately one-fourth of IRR personnel are classified as RT-12s (released from active/trained status for less than twelve months). Of those RT-12s, approximately 60% are combat arms or combat support. Consequently, of the 415,000 IRR the army could mobilize approximately 62,000 recently trained combat and combat support soldiers with minimal retraining. Assuming a "show rate" of 90% at mobilization stations, RT-12s offer a base of approximately 56,000 recently trained soldiers (response to Desert Storm mobilization exceeded 92%).¹⁵

The efficiency of training IRR soldiers can be shown by an examination of a model developed by Third Infantry Division during Desert Shield. The division demonstrated that these soldiers could be trained to crew standards and deployed within fifteen to thirty days, or trained to platoon standards and deployed in platoon packages in thirty to forty-five days, depending on MOS. A brief review of the Third Infantry Division Desert Storm IRR mobilization training package provides both evidence of the utility of this valuable resource and a model for future mobilizations.

The President's announcement on 18 January, 1990 to mobilize the reserves set several actions in motion. Heretofore plans for IRR mobilization were largely untested. Several TRADOC bases were notified and Forts Benning, Knox, Sill, and Leonard Wood prepared to receive, process, and train a total of 16,000 previously trained IRR soldiers. Concurrently, Third Infantry Division in Europe was notified to prepare for receipt of an

undetermined number of soldiers from the TRADOC schools once individual refresher training had been completed. These soldiers were to be received in "crew packages" and trained by Third Infantry Division to crew proficiency for follow-on deployment, as qualified crews, to South West Asia. It was envisioned that these crews would act as immediate fillers for casualties during the conflict.

On receipt of the mission, and given little initial guidance, Third Infantry Division began planning. The restated mission read "3ID receives IRR and trains them at Grafenwhor Germany for follow-on deployment, in eighteen days, as M1A1 tank, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, 155 and 8" howitzer crews." The mission was approached as a three phased operation.

Phase I included reception and inprocessing of the IRR. Understanding that the IRR had been trained to individual standards at TRADOC bases and "prepackaged" as crews prior to arrival in Europe, the initial phase included in-depth surveys to determine individual skills and experience. After analysis of these surveys teams of 3ID Master Gunners personally interviewed each crew to determine crew positions and validate crew rosters. A Processing for Overseas Movement (POM) site was also established and manned twenty-four hours a day to detect any personal problems or encumbrances to deployment to SWA. As a result of this process, several crew roster changes were made and numerous POM discrepancies were resolved. Once POM'd and rostered the crews moved under "cadre control" to an issue

facility where they were issued a complete set of field equipment (TA 50-901). From this moment forward the IRR moved, ate, slept, and trained as crews and were under direct cadre supervision down to the individual crew level. Phase I was systematically accomplished within forty-eight hours of the IRR arrival.

Phase II, the training phase, was dual tracked and focused on common skills training at the individual and crew level (track 1) and on gunnery training (track 2). Crews were divided during in-processing interviews into two distinct groups - those that were prepared to move directly to the weapons ranges and those who required preliminary training in common tasks and small arms. Track one training concentrated on individual and crew served weapons specific to the MOS of the crew. Instruction on tank and BFV gunnery techniques was provided and Conduct of Fire Trainers (COFT) were scheduled to refresh weaker crews. In addition, common task training in NBC, First Aid, and Law of Land War was provided. Tracks one and two were completed in seven days. On day eight of the training the Tracks rotated.

Track two was an intensified gunnery program culminating in a Table VIII qualification for each crew. It included a Gunnery Skills Test, Tank and Bradley Crew Proficiency Courses, Field Artillery Certification, Tank and Bradley tables VI, VII, and VIII, and a Field Artillery section livefire. Tables for the M1A1 and BFV were modified to replicate a South West Asia scenario. This included extended ranges, increased times for engagement, more hull-down targets, and a greater number of RPG

teams and more multiple engagements on the move. NBC engagements were also emphasized.

Phase III was deployment. A program was developed for graduation, out-processing and recovery of equipment. While it should be noted that deployment was not accomplished due to the shortness of the ground war, the crews were nonetheless prepared and in most cases eager to deploy.

A few statistics may provide insight into the merit of this method to generate rapid combat power.

-- Third Infantry Division received 1,908 IRR.

-- Of these, 620 had previous track commander or gunner experience.

-- Excellence in Armor and Infantry Fast Track totaled 278.

-- The vast majority of IRR were Specialist (E4), however, 243 were of NCO rank.

-- From these individual soldiers crews were trained to standard within fifteen days and made fully deployable within eighteen days. These included:

** 108 Bradley Crews

** 115 dismounted sections

** 120 M1A1 crews

** twenty-four 155mm crews, and ten 8" crews.

-- Of all the crews that began training only two did not qualify during the scheduled training. These two crews had previous experience in the M60 series tank and had never crewed a M1.

--Resources. Costs for intensified training were high, but could be leveraged if training plans and resources are identified and apportioned early. Additionally, as greater numbers of IRR are trained the incremental costs could be reduced as many are fixed to facility and range preparation. The following resources were applied to the Third Infantry Division IRR training:

** Approximately \$3 million.

** One brigade headquarters with the cadre of two Armor and two Infantry battalions.

** One forward support battalion.

** Two battalions each of M1A1 tanks and M2 Bradleys.

** Seventeen 155mm and twelve 8-inch Howitzers.

Following the Third Infantry Division IRR training period a "hotwash AAR" was conducted with the following points being highlighted. First, the IRR were high quality and well motivated. It is fair to assume that the group was representative, in that they came from all regions of the United States, in several MOSs, and from all economic and social levels. The only universal factors were that they were all RT-12s and had responded to the mobilization call-up. Secondly, standardized crew training was proven a sound practice. The crews bonded quickly and attacked the training program enthusiastically. Dividing the crews into Track 1 and Track 2 was correct and important - as it allowed for preliminary gunnery training for lesser capable crews. Third, gunnery skills were easily recaptured. This was further reinforced by a study conducted by

the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral Social Sciences (ARI). In their report entitled Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Call-up: Skill Decay, they asserted that written test skills decayed mostly within the first six months since separation; weapon qualification skills decayed mostly after ten months of separation.¹⁶ Non-Commissioned Officers were the key to the training program. Direct cadre leadership with Non-Commissioned Officers down to the crew level provided essential training to the IRR crews. This direct leadership was essential to rapid "spin-up." Likewise, the use of Master Gunners early in the cycle was important. Finally, the crew training model is expandable to platoon training. With few additional resources, other than time and perhaps land, the crew model can be quickly converted to a platoon training model.¹⁷ Expansion would include continuing training through live fire tables IX, XI, and XII. Maneuver training packages would be developed emphasizing the Situational Training Exercises (STXs) approach. Regional scenarios could be built into the STXs to account for anticipated battlefield conditions (e.g., open or closed terrain, built-up areas, contaminated environment, etc.). Cadre leadership down to individual crew level would be maintained to ensure rapid assimilation of the crews into platoon packages.

A fundamental concern in the platoon training model is leadership. Overcoming this hurdle will require active component assistance. The lieutenants are available in the reserve pool. Every year ROTC cadets are graduated and placed on Reserve

status. While adequate numbers are available, the concern is early identification and activation to allow for requisite training prior to the Reserve Component lieutenants joining their platoons. A separate and accelerated training track would be necessary to prepare the platoon leader prior to his joining the platoon.

The critical asset which the IRR base cannot supply in appropriate numbers is senior Non-Commissioned Officers. It is in this area that the active component must respond. Senior Non-Commissioned Officers are not grown or groomed in the Individual Ready Reserve. They must be provided by the active forces. To accomplish this, Non-Commissioned Officers in both TO&E and TDA units must be identified to fill platoon sergeant vacancies when mobilization is announced. Once identified, the positions must be coded and periodic training administered through the Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). While this may appear radical, it should be noted that during the Persian Gulf War a large number of officers and a lesser number of Non-Commissioned Officers were drawn from the TRADOC school system and elsewhere to fill critical staff positions for deploying units.

Additionally, attention should be devoted to maintaining and expanding the IRR pool. Several recommendations deserve exploration. First, expand the RT-12 to an RT-18 criteria. Expanding the time in which recently trained IRR are subject to recall is not affected, however, the base that we define as

"recently trained" is expanded by six months. By this simple change the Recently Trained pool expands by over 50,000, of which 30,000 would be combat and combat support personnel. If, as the ARI study indicates, decay of weapons skills does not begin until approximately ten months after separation, and "spin-up" is rapid, as suggested by the Third Infantry Division training experience, then it follows that minimal resources would be required to train the six month delta.

Another recommendation is the establishment of an incentive to encourage the IRR to maintain their availability for recall. An annual recall of all RT-18s for one day is feasible. Upon notification the RT-18s report to local posts and facilities for one day of a designated week. Facilities would include Armed Forces Examination Stations to preclude the need for excessive travel and reduce costs. On arrival RT-18s would be administered a physical training test and a urinalysis. The successful completion of both would qualify the IRR soldier for a cash award. Keeping in mind the results of the ARI study on "skill decay" it is not advisable to administer written MOSQ tests.

In real terms the IRR manpower pool is capable of filling the AC ALO vacancies and providing an additional thirty battalion equivalents of combat strength in the near-term. Given 62,000 RT-12 combat and combat support personnel, and a 75% worst-case recertification rate, over 11,000 crews could be provided the active force. By comparison, a standard mechanized division contains ten maneuver battalions. If the division suffers 40%

combat losses it is considered to be combat ineffective. To replace losses in the division would require 232 crews. Cross leveling of the leadership within the platoons and companies would remain a requirement using the crew replacement reconstitution technique. It is feasible, given 11,000 crews, to replace the combat arms and combat support crew losses of a combat ineffective division thirty-one separate times. While this is an obvious oversimplification, it graphically illustrates the significant trained manpower pool available to the active force shortly after mobilization.

What then of the ARNG? If the IRR can fill the necessary short term demands for personnel and crew requirements, and the USAR fulfills the combat service support needs, is there a supportable requirement for a National Guard? The answer is yes, but not in accordance with the current mobilization concept. It is not realistic to expect guard units of brigade and division size to assemble, train, deploy, and fight within seventy-five days of mobilization. A more realistic expectation of the ARNG would be to train to platoon and company standards given their limited training days (thirty-nine days per year). Within approximately fifteen to thirty days of concentrated training, after mobilization, guard units could be deployed in "company packages" and employed within the theater to build battalions under active component command and control. Following this methodology, the company packages of three of the six follow-on ARNG divisions could provide 120 combat arms companies, or the

equivalent of thirty additional battalions of combat power within approximately thirty days. Combat support elements such as artillery, engineer, and air defense units could likewise deploy company size units. Subsequent to the deployment of the companies the remaining ARNG structures would revert to "cadre" status. The divisions would be reconstituted with non-RT-12 IRRs and volunteers to train for follow-on deployment at M+360.

The effect of this shift in deployment/employment criteria would be to move three of the six ARNG divisions into a new category of Training and Cadre Divisions. (The remaining three ARNG divisions would not be affected by this change in mission. They could however, be expected to be deployed into theater later in the force projection sequence since thirty battalion equivalents of IRR and thirty battalion equivalents of ARNG would be available within thirty days.) The Training and Cadre Division mission would be to continue all state supported requirements and respond to the various states Adjutants General per current directives. Secondly, they would train platoons and companies to ARTEP standards. Emphasis during active training (AT) periods would be directed to platoon and company size operations. Leadership training for battalion and above would be accomplished through simulations and whatever training could be gleaned during AT without interfering with the platoon and company training. Third, upon mobilization, the three divisions would deploy their units in platoon and company packages as dictated by AC requirements. Upon completion of the deployment,

the three ARNG divisions revert to cadre status and prepare to receive fillers, train, and eventually deploy into theater.

There are obvious political ramifications to these recommendations. A strong bias exists in the ARNG to retain current missions and organizations. Additionally, the Reserve Components enjoy a solid political base in Congress. The political reality is that there is an armory in every district - the significance of this is not lost on our politicians. The Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal 1991 states "The Department of Defense should shift a greater share of force structure and budgetary resources to the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces. Expanding the Reserve Components is the most effective way to retain quality personnel as the force structure of the Active Components is reduced over the next five years." The Congress went on to say, "the structure and strength of the current Reserve Components should be preserved; the equipment levels in existing Reserve component units should be increased to match their active duty counterparts; and selected missions of the Active Components of the armed forces should be increasingly transferred to the Reserve Components..."¹⁸

To counter this bias the Department of Defense must assure Congress that there is no intent to disband the ARNG. They perform, and will continue to perform, a vital mission in our nation's defense - that of follow-on reinforcements and reconstitution during mobilization. In fact the proposal to deploy initial elements in platoon and company size

organizations, and revert to Cadre status, receive, train, and prepare for follow-on deployment is a major increase in mission. Secondly, we must not de-link the ARNG from their obligations or responsiveness to the states. They provide heroic assistance during natural disasters under the direct control of state governors. This relationship will continue and not be usurped unless and until a "national emergency" dictates mobilization.

Furthermore, a strong AC/RC relationship must be developed between the ARNG division which trains and maintains the companies and the active component divisions that receive them. It is envisioned that one RC division could "feed" two active divisions with replacement companies. (Rapidly deployable divisions [AC] would be excluded due to early response requirements.) Training affiliations must include platoon and company ARTEPs conducted under the direction and evaluation of the active component. Active divisions would also provide a limited number of "full time" active duty personnel to the ARNG division. The function of this small cell would be to provide liaison, coordinate training, and reinforce unit Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Finally, units designated to reinforce the active component must be modernized. They must receive the same priorities for equipment as their AC counterparts.

IMPACT AND COSTS OF CHANGE


What are the advantages of this system of employment? First

is the rapid generation of combat power. Company size packages could be deployed to receiving divisions in less than thirty days. This model generates a minimum of thirty maneuver battalion equivalents, plus possible combat support and combat service support excursions. Second, peacetime training of ARNG units is more in line with capabilities. Training to platoon and company level is feasible, whereas training to battalion, brigade and division is not due to the complicated nature of combined arms operations at these levels. Third, AC and RC share the responsibility for training the ARNG companies. This shared responsibility assists in bonding and negates the "we-they" biases that currently exist. Fourth, the ARNG retain a vital mission. In fact, their mission increases while they are given additional responsibilities and equipment. Fifth, state affiliations remain intact and are the primary mission of the Guard unless mobilized. And sixth, in the event of war and full mobilization losses of National Guardsmen would be dissipated across the force.

Costs borne by such a change are minimal. Within the ARNG it would be necessary to "double cadre" at platoon and company level. This would allow one set of leadership to deploy, while the second set reverted to cadre status and began training. If each platoon double-slotted the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, and each company double-slotted the commander and first sergeant the cost would be 160 additional leaders per division for the maneuver elements. Therefore, authorizations of an

additional 160 service members would be allotted these divisions. Second, active divisions would provide a full-time liaison to the ARNG. If an ARNG division supports two active divisions, then two such cells would be provided. Cells conceivably would include one field grade and two company grade officers, three to five non-commissioned officers, and administrative support. All inclusive, the cell would consist of approximately ten to fifteen personnel provided from the AC divisional TO&E.

While it is not the intent of this paper to deal with active



component force structure, an excursion in that direction may

serve to further emphasize the importance of company level fill from the ARNG. If, for the sake of argument, end-strengths require cutting AC structure below the 535,000 base force, an option may be to cut one line company from each maneuver battalion. Active component "three-by-three" battalions of three line companies each with three full-up platoons are very "fightable." Additionally, they are quite expandable. Given ARNG companies that were trained through a partnership program, the active component could quickly accommodate a fourth and perhaps even a fifth company into the battalion.

A further question arises when considering the battalion level leadership for ARNG companies. Two options exist. First, companies could be used to "round up" existing active component battalion structures in much the same manner as suggested for IRR augmentation. The ARNG company becomes the Delta, or in some cases the Echo company, of the battalion. This takes advantage of an in-place structure. The major disadvantage to this method would be that the battalion's ability to command and control and support such a large organization would be severely stretched.

A second alternative would be to organize three or four ARNG companies into a separate maneuver battalion with one such battalion being assigned to each maneuver brigade. Leadership and staff for the battalion would be provided by the active component. These mobilization leadership positions would be identified in the AC organization and could be augmented by active duty officers and non-commissioned officers serving in TDA


positions. Once again, a system would have to be developed to designate, monitor, and train these augmentation personnel. Officers on the alternate list for command are an example of potential mobilization leaders.

An aspect that has not yet been addressed is the law governing the organization and administration of the Army, Title 10, United States Code. To implement the program I have described requires changes in our mobilization laws. Or, at the very least, the realization that Partial Mobilization will be necessary to fight any major regional contingency. To allow proper lead time for training the IRR, and for concentrated training of ARNG, the President must be able to call up both Selected and Ready Reserves in accordance with section 673a and 673b, Title 10. Current callup procedures wherein we progress from Selective Mobilization to Presidential Call-Up and finally to Partial Mobilization (which includes IRR personnel) are time consuming and often subject to being encumbered by politics. Time is of the essence. Expeditious callup of IRR personnel is essential to ensure rapid initiation of the training process.

CONCLUSION

The two proposals discussed in this paper calling for new ways to employ the IRR and ARNG will net the following advantages. First, the equivalent of sixty battalions of combat power would be generated in thirty days or less. Second, training of soldiers during peacetime would be more in line with

capabilities of the organization. Third, the structure of the AC and RC would remain relatively intact, thus retaining leadership in the eventuality of a long war. And finally, there are no major allocations of funds required to generate additional combat power. Costs for these programs will be borne equally by active and reserve organizations.



Arguably, these proposed changes to force employment and modification to force mix constitute a radical departure to current force generation models. Now is the time for radical change. Posturing heavy, well trained, superbly equipped and led soldiers is essential to our national strategy. The total force

must accept the challenge, share the burden, and provide the nation a capability within reasonable political and economic constraints.

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